Name: Remnant
Author: Fletcher Whitney

FEDERALIST No. 10
The Same Subject Continued
(The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
From the Daily Advertiser. Thursday, November 22, 1787.
To the People of the State of New York:
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed
Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The
friend of popular governments never finds himself so much
alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates
their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail,
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a
proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion
introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the
mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful
topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most
specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the
American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be
an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as
effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and
expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most
considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of
public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty,
that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is
disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority. However
anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation,
the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that
they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a
candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses
under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the
operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same
time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our
heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing
and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for
private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent
to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of
the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit
has tainted our public administrations.
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the
one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:
the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its
existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy,
that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what
air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires.
But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is
essential to political life, because it nourishes faction,
than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is
essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its
destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be
unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and
he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason
and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a
reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be
objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The
diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is
the first object of government. From the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of
different degrees and kinds of property immediately results;
and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of
the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society
into different interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;
and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of
activity, according to the different circumstances of civil
society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion,
concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons
of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to
the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much
more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate
for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind
to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly
passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most
common and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who
are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,
fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in
civilized nations, and divide them into different classes,
actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of
these various and interfering interests forms the principal
task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a
body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same
time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation,
but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large
bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of
legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they
determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a
question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the
debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between
them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges;
and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most
powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic
manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions
on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently
decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably
by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good.
The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of
property is an act which seems to require the most exact
impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in
which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a
predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every
shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
shilling saved to their own pockets.
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to
adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient
to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at
the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made
at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations,
which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one
party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the
good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes
of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be
sought in the means of controlling its effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority
to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the
administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be
unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public
good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government, is then the great object to which our
inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great
desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of
two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest
in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the
majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be
rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to
concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the
impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well
know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on
as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the
injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy
in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in
proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure
democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government
in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert
result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing
to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have
ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights
of property; and have in general been as short in their lives
as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians,
who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously
supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be
perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions,
their opinions, and their passions.
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and
promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the
points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall
comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which
it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the
latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere
of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation,
it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may
be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or
of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether
small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election
of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly
decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations.
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small
the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a
certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few;
and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a
certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a
multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two
cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents,
and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it
follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less
in the large than in the small republic, the former will
present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability
of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a
greater number of citizens in the large than in the small
republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to
practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are
too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more
free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the
most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established
characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases,
there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be
found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors,
you render the representatives too little acquainted with all
their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing
it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too
little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects.
The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this
respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to
the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens
and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass
of republican than of democratic government; and it is this
circumstance principally which renders factious combinations
less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The
smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct
parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be
found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals
composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in
a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive
to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it
to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that,
where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes,
communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to
the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a
republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, — is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the
advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior
to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be
denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely
to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the
greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties,
against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and
oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety
of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security.
Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to
the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust
and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union
gives it the most palpable advantage.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;
but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it
must secure the national councils against any danger from that
source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for
an equal division of property, or for any other improper or
wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of
the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county
or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we
behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure
and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal
in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of
Federalists.
PUBLIUS.